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Exchange of Information Under the
OECD and US Model Tax Treaties
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic function of income tax treaties' is the relief of the
burden of double taxation on taxpayers. Whenever an enterprise
enters an inter-country transaction or an individual steps across a
national boundary, the possibility of double taxation arises. As in-
ternational trade and commerce have expanded, the problem has
increased. Despite this, the problem has been a long-standing one.
As long ago as 1775, Lord Mansfield said: "No country ever takes
notice of the revenue laws of another." 2
The problem of international tax evasion has not received
much attention, but nevertheless, it has serious international ramifi-
cations. Most importantly, it can serve to frustrate revenue gather-
ing efforts of those countries most in need of additional revenue to
aid developing economies. 3 Thus, the need for adequate protections
against evasion has taken on increased significance in recent years.
The problems of double taxation and tax evasion in an interna-
tional context can be reduced by either provisions in the tax code of
a particular country or by bilateral tax treaties.4 Initial measures to
combat international double taxation were unilateral in nature.5
For example, the United States adopted the foreign tax credit mech-
anism, which treats taxes paid to a foreign country as if they were
paid to the United States.6 Even so, the weaknesses of unilateral
measures caused many countries to seek supplementary arrange-
ments.7 A network of tax treaties between commercial partners has
been the result.8 Significantly, these treaties include provisions spe-
1. The terms "treaty" and "convention" are often used interchangeably. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.894-1(a) (1975) ("treaty" as used in § 894 includes "convention").
2. Holman v. Johnson, [17751 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121.
3. van Hoorn, Problems, Possibilities, and Limitations With Respect to Measures Against
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 763, 773 (1978).
4. J. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 41 (1977).
5. van Hoorn, supra note 3, at 764.
6. See I.R.C. §§ 901-906 (1982).
7. See Trelles, Double Taxation/Fiscal Evasion and International Tax Treaties, 12 IND.
L. REV. 341 (1979).
8. The United States is signatory to twenty-six bilateral tax conventions or treaties
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cifically designed to attack the problem of fiscal evasion.9
A model tax treaty for use by industrial nations was prepared
in 1963 by the Organization for Economic- Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), and revised in 1977. 10 Article 26 of the OECDMC
provides for the exchange of information between contracting
States, and was included to deal with the evasion problem. I Also,
applicable to thirty-eight independent nations and eight territories of other nations. U.S.
Dep't. of the Treasury, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE (1979).
9. Tax treaties have provided nations with an important tool to deal with the problem
of tax avoidance. The number of countries involved in such arrangements is increasing as
an understanding of the consequences of international taxation evolves. Brazil, India, and
Pakistan are among the developing countries which have negotiated such treaties. See Sur-
rey, United Nation Group of Experts and the Guidelinesfor Tax Treaties Between Developed
and Developing Countries, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1978).
10. OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as OECDMC.
11. OECDMC, Article 26, states:
I. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such infor-
mation as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the
domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by the Conven-
tion insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The
exchange of information is not restricted by Article 1 (Personal Scope). Any infor-
mation received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same man-
ner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be
disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bod-
ies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in
respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by the
Convention. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such
purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in
judicial decisions.
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph I be construed so as to impose on
a Contracting State the obligation:
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and admin-
istrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial,
commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information, the disclosure
of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).
3. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Arti-
cle, the other Contracting State shall obtain the information to which the request
relates in the same manner and to the same extent as if the tax of the first-men-
tioned State were the tax of that other State and were being imposed by that other
State. If specifically requested by the competent authority of a Contracting State,
the competent authority of the other Contracting State shall provide information
under this Article in the form of depositions of witnesses and authenticated copies
of unedited original documents (including books, papers, statements, records, ac-
counts, or writing), to the same extent such depositions and documents can be ob-
tained under the laws and administrative practices of such other State with respect
to its own taxes.
4. Each of the Contracting States shall endeavor to collect on behalf of the other
Contracting State such amounts as may be necessary to enure that relief granted by
the present Convention from taxation imposed by such other Contracting State
does not enure to the benefits of persons not entitled thereto.
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in 1977, the United States Treasury Department released the text of
its version of a model income tax treaty which itself conforms
closely to the OECDMC revision.' 2
This Note will explore the basic parameters of the exchange of
information provisions. Moreover, because taxation is an important
tool for developing economies the Note will explore how the elimi-
nation of tax evasion is a crucial objective of these provisions. Ac-
cordingly, the Note examines the work of the UN Group of Experts
and the contributions they have made to the understanding of the
problems involved in tax relationships between developed and de-
veloping nations.
Also, practitioners should be alerted to a decision on this sub-
ject by the Second District Court of Appeals. At issue in the case
was the construction of the exchange of information provision in a
United States tax treaty with Canada. After reviewing the provi-
sion, the court determined that foreign countries can obtain tax in-
formation concerning domestic companies through the IRS. The
decision signifies an increase in the impact that such provisions can
have on tax policy.
The Note concludes with the recommendation that a greater
commitment to supplying developing countries with tax information
and assistance is needed. This requires an emphasis on the imple-
mentation of exchange of information provisions. Significantly,
these provisions not only benefit developing countries but also can
enhance international business relations and opportunities.
II. THE PROBLEM OF TAX EVASION
The tremendous growth of international trade and investment
has stimulated the rise of a significant problem: international tax
evasion.' 3 Unlike the problem of double taxation, the problem of
5. Paragraph 4 of this Article shall not impose upon either of the Contracting
States the obligation to carry out administrative measures which are of a different
nature from those used in the collection of its own tax, or which would be contrary
to its sovereignty, security, or public policy.
6. For the purpose of this Article, this Convention shall apply to taxes of every
kind imposed by a Contracting State.
The Commentary on Article 26 has been considerably enlarged as compared with the 1963
text and has introduced the new concepts of automatic and spontaneous exchange of infor-
mation. Id. at Commentary, No. 9(b), (4).
12. M. CARROLL, INCOME TAX TREATIES 51, 70 (J. Bischel ed. 1978).
13. Eichel, Administration Aspects of the Prevention and Control of International Tax
Evasion, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1965).
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tax evasion has not received widespread concern.14 Quite often, the
major difficulty is that the states involved do not wish to grapple
with the problem. The Internal Revenue Service has expressed in-
terest in this problem but has been limited in the kind of assistance
it can provide. 15
Only recently has there been any significant measure of con-
cern about fiscal evasion.' 6 In large part, this apathy has been due to
the fact that "the administrative problems inherent in world-wide
enforcement are both technically complex and fraught with political
and diplomatic ramifications."' 17 Reflecting the increase in concern
about the problem, the 1977 OECDMC is worded much more
clearly and is more extensive on this subject than its 1963
predecessor. 18
One of the basic cornerstones of an effective tax enforcement
system is intelligence. 19 "The function of intelligence (information
gathering) is to determine the extent to which taxpayer compliance
is being achieved. Through an efficient intelligence network, tax of-
ficials can ascertain which individuals or entities are engaged in ac-
tivities that result in tax liability, and the extent of that liability. "20
Of primary importance to any tax system is the need to maintain a
systematic flow of information to the tax authorities.21 Such a sys-
tem serves an important indirect compliance purpose. "Those who
might otherwise evade the revenue laws refrain from doing so be-
cause they are aware that the government is receiving information
as to their income." 22
Section 7602 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code provides for
the collection of information from the taxpayer. 23 It authorizes the
14. Trelles, supra note 7, at 363.
15. Id.
16. Eichel, supra note 13, at 27.
17. Id.
18. Trelles, supra note 7, at 363.
19. Eichel, supra note 13, at 28.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 29.
22. Id.
23. I.R.C. § 7602 (1982) (examination of books and witnesses).
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
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issuance of a summons and the production of books and records to
determine the liability of any person "for any internal revenue
tax." 24 Other countries have similar provisions for gathering infor-
mation, but in many cases, suffer from inefficient and unsophistica-
ted systems.25 Tax treaties between nations also consistently provide
for sharing of information, but the continuing emphasis on double
taxation has placed fiscal evasion in a subsidiary position in terms of
providing effective safeguards.26
III. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS IN TAX TREATIES
Initially, it was recognized that the primary interest of the
United States was not in the relief of double taxation. The govern-
ment felt that it had already alleviated double taxation by the uni-
lateral code provisions. But concerns relating to the prevention of
fraud or fiscal evasion and the simplification of tax administration
remained.27 As one approach to preventing tax evasion, tax treaties
were implemented which commonly included provisions for the ex-
change of information between governments.28
Typically, the foreign country reports to the United States thoge
taxpayers from whom it has withheld a tax and whose addresses are
in the United States. The United States, at the same time, follows a
similar process. As a result, both nations receive data about foreign
income received and the amount of foreign taxes paid by their citi-
zens and residents. Generally, information may be exchanged
either as part of a routine process or, in particular cases, in response
to a particular request. In exchanging information, the contracting
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or
care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or
his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a
time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records,
or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or mate-
rial to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry.
24. Id.
25. van Hoorn, supra note 3, at 764-65.
26. Eichel, supra note 13, at 77.
27. See JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
TAX CONVENTIONS (1962).
28. OECDMC, art. 26; United States Treasury Model Convention, Treas. Dept. News
Release B-235 (May 17, 1977) reprinted in [1977] TAX TREATIES (P-H) 1019 [hereinafter
cited as USMT].
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nations are not obligated to supply data that is unobtainable. They
do not have to carry out administrative measures which are not per-
mitted in their respective nations, or to provide information which
would disclose trade or public secrets.
29
The problem of tax avoidance, on the other hand, entails efforts
on the part of the taxpayer to reduce tax liabilities. The taxpayer
may not be doing anything illegal, though his actions may be
against the spirit of the law. The difference lies in the fact that tax
avoidance is usually openly carried out and only requires an effec-
tive auditing decision to discover and close loopholes, whereas tax
evasion consists of facts that should be disclosed but which are
either not entirely disclosed or are not disclosed at all.30 Where tax-
payers willfully contravene the law and do not meet their tax obliga-
tions, they expose themselves to any penal consequences the law
may prescribe. The existence of tax evasion requires, therefore, spe-
cial investigation mechanisms in order to obtain the most accurate
information to expose the fraud.3'
At the international level, a sharp distinction cannot always be
made between tax evasion and tax avoidance. Treaties providing
for an exchange of information do not usually distinguish between
the two. 32 "Where information exchanged reveals a case of fraud,
the country or countries concerned will then have to apply their do-
mestic penal provisions. '33
Exchange of information between countries, though in a stage
of infancy, is increasingly being advocated as an effective tool in
dealing with taxpayer's efforts to minimize or eliminate their taxes
in the countries in which they operate. Certain new developments
in this area indicate how strongly the need for a consistent and so-
phisticated system of cooperation is felt. The highlights of these de-
velopments will be discussed in this Note. They are worthy of due
consideration in this emerging and important area of international
taxation.
29. OECDMC, art. 26(2); USMT, art. 26(2) & 26(5). See also Namorato, The Govern-
ment's Tools in the Investigation ofa Criminal Fraud Case, 34 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1019
(1976).
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A. UN Proposals
In 1967, the Economic and Social Council of the United Na-
tions established the United Nations Group of Experts on Tax Trea-
ties Between Developed and Developing Countries (UN Group) to
facilitate the conclusion of tax treaties between developing and de-
veloped countries. 34 This Group consists of eighteen members: ten
from developing countries and eight from developed countries.35
The UN Group decided that the most expeditious way to proceed
was to use the 1963 OECDMC as a reference for discussion. 36 "This
model was being used by the developed countries as the framework
for their negotiations." 37 Indeed, that was the purpose of the draft.
38
The developed countries also attempted to apply this model in the
negotiations that were commencing in the 1960's with developing
countries. 39 Differing ideological approaches to international tax is-
sues, however, provided incentive for the formation of the UN
Group and its consideration of various policy positions.40
The UN Group has held seven meetings and has issued a re-
port on each meeting.41 Aspects of the 1977 changes to the
34. E.S.C. Res. 1273, 43 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 5, U.N. Doe. E/4429 (1967).
35. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 5-6.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 7.
41. The reports have been published by the United Nations under the title, TAX TREA-
TIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. All but the last Report are di-
vided into two parts, one being a summary of the proceedings, the other consisting of a
suggestion and consideration prepared by the Secretary General on behalf of the Expert
Group. The Reports bear respectively, the following document numbers:
U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries: First Report, U.N. Doe. ST/ECA/ 110 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as First Report];
U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries: Second Report, U.N. Doe. ST/ECA/137 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Second Report);
U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries: Third Report, U.N. Doe. ST/ECA/166 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Third Report];
U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries: Fourth Report, U.N. Do. ST/ECA/188 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Fourth Report];
U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries: Fifth Report, U.N. Doe. ST/ESA/18 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Fifth Report];
U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries: Sixth Report, U.N. Doe. ST/ESA/42 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Sixth Report];
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OECDMC were largely adopted and incorporated into the UN
Group's material. After the fifth meeting, the UN Group also pre-
pared Guidelinesfor Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing
Countries covering their efforts to that time.42 "The subject of ex-
change of information occupied a prominent place in the work of
the UN Group."43 The Group's discussions had placed great em-
phasis on the prevention of tax evasion, and all members saw the
process of exchange of information as a valuable weapon in achiev-
ing that goal. The developing nations especially feel a strong need
for information, if only to benefit from the "superior investigative
facilities" of their colleagues in industralized countries.4 It has
even been argued that a provision on the exchange of information
may be the most valuable contribution a convention can make to
the tax effort of a developing country.45
"A member from a developing country pointed out that the an-
nual loss of tax revenue and, in particular, foreign exchange suffered
by his country was of major proportions even in relation to the for-
eign aid that the country received."' 6 This implies that the problem
of tax evasion weakens the monetary position of the suffering coun-
try as the uncertain state of tax law administration distorts the flow
of goods and capital among countries. 47 It is equally true that all
countries, and developing countries in particular, need tax revenues
to meet the goals of their socio-economic policies. Therefore, it is
valid, even desirable, for countries to take measures to safeguard
their economic interests. The requirement of equal tax treatment
protects these principles. Moreover, an adequate system providing
for the exchange of information can lead to a rectification of the
existing discrepancies.
The UN Group adopted an exchange of information provision
that differs from the OECD version in two important respects. First,
it is expressly stated that the exchange of information shall be made
U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries: Seventh Report, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/78 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Seventh Report].
42. U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between
Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Guidelines].
43. Surrey, supra note 9, at 49.
44. First Report, supra note 41, Ch. V, para. 86.
45. See Third Report, supra note 41, at pt. 1.
46. Id. at pt. I., Ch. III, para. 151.
47. Forry & Lerner, Taxing Multinational Enterprises.- Yasic Issues of International In-
come Tax Harmonization, 10 INT'L LAW. 623 (1976).
[Vol. 5
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"for the prevention of fraud and evasion." 48 This addition empha-
sizes the need to pay stricter attention to the problem of evasion. 49
Second, the UN Group desired to place an affirmative obligation on
the authorities to fully implement the exchange of information arti-
cle. This was done by inserting the following sentence: "The com-
petent authorities shall, through consultations, develop appropriate
conditions, methods, and techniques concerning the matters respect-
ing which such information shall be made, as well as exchange of
information regarding avoidance of tax where appropriate." 50 This
second addition is the key to the approach of the UN Group. They
considered that the benefits of tax administration could only be ob-
tained if there was adequate focus and consideration given to the
issue. 5'
Included in the Sixth Report was a detailed inventory of the
factors and techniques involved in the exchange of information.
The UN Group viewed the article as delegating full authority to the
competent authorities for the administration of the provision. The
Group's primary thrust was to remove any obstacles, real or
imagined, to the effective exchange of information. The essence of
the Group's creativity was in the realization that such a provision is
crucial to the interests of developing nations.52
One of the major points of concern to developing countries is
the determination of how and by what method information ought to
be supplied.53 A representative from a developing country recom-
mended to the UN Group the formation of a multilateral agreement
on the exchange of information and the establishment of a perma-
nent body to implement such exchange through collection and dis-
semination of information. 54 The Group viewed the proposal as
48. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 49.
49. Id.
50. Guidelines, supra note 42, at 64.
51. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 49.
52. Id.
53. van Hoorn, supra note 3, at 771.
54. See van Hoorn, supra note 3, at 771-72. See, e.g., A proposal by S. Gafny, member
of the U.N. Group of Experts to create an international agency, A Multilateral Agreement
on the Exchange of Information Concerning Direct Taxation and on Mutual Assistance in
Tax Administration, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AG. 8/L.20 (1977). Mr. Gafny's proposed interna-
tional body would be:
set up on the basis of a multilateral agreement on the exchange of information and
on mutual assistance in tax machinery to make these effective and adequate as part
of the measures required to combat tax evasion which, in the opinion of their rep-
resentatives, is one of the main problems with which the developing countries are
1982]
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premature because of the many difficulties it presented. 5 Neverthe-
less, it did suggest that the UN Secretariat "consider the possibility
of undertaking preparatory work for such a project."
56
Such a proposal, although complex and fraught with numerous
problems, is suggestive of the kind of measures that are needed to
work out current inequities in tax administration. Much thinking
and discussion remains to be done. The stress of the UN Group on
the implementation of the exchange of information provision (Arti-
cle 26) signals a possible end to the neglect of that provision by
treaty countries.
57
Of additional importance is the fact that at present there is still
only a small number of tax treaties between developed and develop-
ing countries. 58 The need for the exchange of information is espe-
cially crucial for developing countries. Tax administrations of some
developed countries have worked out bilateral or multilateral
schemes for regular consultation and information. 59 Such arrange-
ments are encouraged because of the potentially significant benefits
for maturing nations.
B. Construction of U.S. Treaty Provisions
The question of whether a foreign country can obtain tax infor-
mation pertaining to a U.S. corporation was squarely settled in
United States v. A.L Burbank & Co. 60 The case is significant in that
it is the only time the courts have been called upon to interpret the
exchange of information provisions in tax treaties. Its significance
also lies in the fact that it advances the objectives of such provisions
by requiring compliance with requests for information regarding
foreign tax liability by utilizing the same investigative techniques
that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could employ if that person
were under investigation for domestic tax liability.
Construing the tax treaty of 1942 between the U.S. and Ca-
nada,6' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a dis-
concerned. In the course of time the institutions set up under such an agreement
might develop into a body embracing the whole field of direct taxations.
55. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 52.
56. Seventh Report, supra note 41, at 59.
57. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 53.
58. van Hoorn, supra note 3, at 772.
59. See, e.g., Internal Revenue News Release IR-1839, (1977) 779 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) § 6723 (agreement between U.S. and Canada).
60. 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975).
61. 56 Stat. 1399 (1942).
[Vol. 5
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trict court's refusal to enforce the summons authority of the IRS
found in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.62 The IRS was attempt-
ing to obtain information from American based corporations solely
for a Canadian tax investigation where there was no United States
interest in the investigation and no claim that U.S. taxpayers were
potentially due and owing.63 The court noted that "the case is one
of first impression in this country."64
The district court had held that there was no authority either in
the treaty or the Code for issuance of an IRS summons solely for the
purpose of aiding Canadian tax authorities in a Canadian tax inves-
tigation.65 In other words, the court refused to enforce the summons
because no concurrent U.S. tax liability was involved.
The court of appeals, however, applied a more liberal construc-
tion to the statute. The court's reading of the statute was based on
the broad purposes of the tax treaty.66 In the court's eyes it was
clear that one purpose of the pact was to provide a means of cooper-
ation between the contracting states whereby information could be
exchanged after it was collected through the administrative
processes provided by the statutory law of each state.67 The court
recognized that the procedural tools of each state were to be avail-
able for use against tax evasion.68 Moreover, the court acknowl-
edged that, to hold that the examination process set forth in the
Code could only be employed in the event of American tax liability
would totally frustrate the purpose of the treaty.69
Because the U.S. was party to eighteen other tax conventions,
at the time the case was decided, it was a crucial decision.70 Indeed,
the court of appeals realized that the narrow interpretation by the
lower court would not only frustrate the Canadian Tax Treaty but
those other conventions with comparable exchange of information
procedures. 7'
The U.S. Treasury Model Convention of 1977 contains explicit
62. See note 23 supra.
63. 525 F.2d at 11.
64. Id.
65. United States v. A.L. Burbank, 74-2 T.C. 9779 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
66. 525 F.2d at 13.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 16-17; 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 659, 667 (1976).
69. 525 F.2d at 13.
70. See 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 391 (1976).
71. 525 F.2d at 13.
19821
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language confirming the result in Burbank.72  Moreover, the
OECDMC, on which much of the U.S. model is based,7 3 has lan-
guage in its commentary which was devastating to the appellee's ar-
guments. 74 The court emphasized that the Commentary provides
that administrative measures employed in one state, "must be uti-
lized even though invoked solely to provide information to the other
Contracting State. '75 Further, the Commentary also requires that
"the requested State has to collect the information the other State
needs in the same way as if its own taxation was involved. '76 These
statements provided ample rationale to the court's holding. Indeed,
approval of the lower court's holding would have been a significant
blow to effective international tax administration.
In making its decision, the court applied the general rule that
treaties are to be broadly construed to enable the intent of the treaty
72. See art. 26(3) which states:
If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article,
the other Contracting State shall obtain the information to which the request re-
lates in the same manner and to the same extent as if the tax of the first-mentioned
State were the tax of that other State and were being imposed by that other State.
If specifically requested by the competent authority of a Contracting State, the
competent authority of the other Contracting State shall provide information
under this Article in the form of depositions of witnesses and authenticated copies
of unedited original documents (including books, papers, statements, records, ac-
counts, or writings), to the same extent such depositions and documents can be
obtained under the laws and administrative practices of such other State with re-
spect to its own taxes.
73. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 6; van Hoorn, supra note 3, at 767-68.
74. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Comentary are quoted in the opinion:
12. This paragraph (Paragraph 2 of the Model Treaty) embodies certain limita-
tions to the main rule in favor of the requested State. In the first place, the para-
graph contains the clarification that a Contracting State is not bound to go beyond
its own internal laws and administrative practice in putting information at the dis-
posal of the other Contracting State. However, types of administrative measures au-
thorized for the purpose of the requested State's tax must be utilized even though
invoked solely to provide information to the other Contracting State. Likewise, inter-
nal provisions concerning tax secrecy should not be interpreted as constituting an
obstacle to the exchange of information under the present Article. As mentioned
above, the authorities of the requesting State are obliged to observe secrecy with
regard to information received under this Article.
14. Information is deemed to be obtainable in the normal course of administra-
tion if it is in the possession of the tax authorities or can be obtained by them in the
normal procedure of tax determination, which may include special investigations or
special examination of the business accounts kept by the taxpayer or other persons
provided the tax authorities would make similar investigations or examination for
their own purposes. This means that the requested has to collect the information the
other State needs in the same way as if its own taxation was involved, under the
proviso mentioned in paragraph 13 above. 525 F.2d at 16. (italics added).
The court relied primarily on paragraphs 12 and 14 for its decision.
See also 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 666 (1976).
75. 525 F.2d at 16.
76. Id. at 14.
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to be enforced.77 Two United States Supreme Court decisions were
relied on, and are particularly relevent to the thrust of this Note. In
Bacardi Corp. v. Domeneck,78 the Court held that more liberal inter-
pretations of a treaty's provision are preferred over restrictive inter-
pretations.79 Further, in Factor v. Lanbanheimer,80 the Court stated:
Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations be-
tween nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that
their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the
apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciproc-
ity between them.8'
The holdings of these cases encourage an activist approach to
exchange of information provisions. Such provisions should not be
regarded as trivial administrative appendages. They have the po-
tential to contribute to an improvement in the economic status of
developing nations and, thus, in the improvement of international
relations. Moreover, liberal enforcement of these provisions will
contribute to the alleviation of the significant, but overlooked, prob-
lem of tax evasion.
The significance of the Burbank decision is clear: factors con-
tributing to tax secrecy should not be permitted to serve as obstacles
to the exchange of tax information between nations. Presumably,
the decision would apply to other covenants with similar provisions.
Accordingly, practitioners should take note of the widespread
ramifications of this decision. Counsel should be aware that foreign
countries have the same degree of access to information as the IRS
does in order to ascertain tax liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Beyond even the traditional problem of apathy on the part of
governments and taxpayers, there are still complex and serious diffi-
culties in reaching workable agreements in international taxation.82
Progress has been made, but much remains to be done.83
77. Havenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 438 (1880); see also Trelles, supra note 7, at 351.
78. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
79. Id. at 163.
80. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
81. Id. at 293.
82. See Trelles, supra note 7, at 377.
83. The work of the United Nations Group of Experts is encouraging, but it is by no
means the final solution. Of particular concern are the issues related to the tax collection
provisions in tax treaties. Information is necessary to establish cases of fiscal evasion. How-
ever, once information is supplied, collection of revenues is appropriate in order to protect
1982]
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Generally, the level of sophistication in the administration of a
tax system reflects the economic development of the country.84
Many countries lack the information and expertise to administer
their tax systems as effectively as more developed nations. Often,
these variations in administration are easily exploited by taxpayers.
Further, difficulties arise from the traditional reluctance of countries
to provide local information. Thus, the flow of goods and capital is
distorted by the uncertain manner in which tax laws are
administered.8
5
Enforcement of exchange of information provisions is of great
interest to developing countries. Certainly those who stand most to
benefit from enforcement are those developing nations in need of
expanded expertise in revenue collection. Developed nations, un-
derstandably suspicious of such notions, have begun to indicate
their willingness to explore the parameters of increased use of ex-
change of information provisions with lesser developed countries.
86
The provisions do not require Contracting States to do anything
that is beyond the laws and administrative procedures that are ap-
plied internally. But the requirement that information which is
available to the other nation as if it had jurisdiction over the person
possessing the information has tremendous potential to deal with
tax evasion and thus create an environment of equal tax treatment.
87
Exchange of information is one facet of a complex array of is-
sues. It is not a panacea. It is, however, advocated as a tool against
the reduction of tax liabilities to the disadvantaged of one country
or another. The world economy stands to benefit from the safe-
guarding of economic interests. Moreover, the principles of justice
and fairness should be pursued for the benefit of the international
community.
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the interests of the concerned government. Such a procedure raises concerns about national
sovereignty and due process and these concerns continue to hamper the formulation of fully
workable agreements. See Trelles, supra note 7, at 369-77.
84. See Forry & Lerner, supra note 47, at 627.
85. Id.
86. Surrey, supra note 9, at 49.
87. van Hoorn, supra note 3, at 773.
